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Abstract
The devolved government in Northern Ireland set about the task of putting in place
‘a modern and effective system of public administration that can deliver high quality public
services to our citizens’. It did so through a review of public administration launched in June
2002. This article offers a formative evaluation of the quest to improve the quality of public
services, now being taken forward by a British minister since the suspension of devolution. It
argues that the review is being driven by institutional concerns and is devoid of a public service
modernising agenda. Additionally, it contends that how people in Northern Ireland perceive
public services is contingent on their views on its constitutional status (Direct Rule or devolved
government) which, in turn, is linked to their support for the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement,
rather than the performance of public bodies. As a consequence, the reforms may result in little
more than institutional tinkering with doubtful impact on the quality of public services.
Introduction
The current structure of public administration in Northern Ireland has evolved
in a piecemeal fashion as a response to the wider political developments in
the Province since the prorogation of its Parliament (Stormont) in March 1972.
That the system of public administration should reflect the socio-economic and
political milieu, in itself, is no surprise. What is different about Northern Ireland is
that the abuse of power in the execution of public services played a significant part
in the demise of devolution from 1921–72 and paved the way for a system of public
administration so distinctive from other parts of the United Kingdom as to earn
it the rather dubious title of ‘a place apart’ (Rose, 1971). With the collapse of the
Northern Ireland Parliament and the subsequent imposition of Direct Rule from
Westminster, a system of public administration evolved as a short-term expedient
until such times as ‘solutions’ to macro constitutional issues could be found. In
the absence of a political settlement, temporary administrative arrangements
bedded in, described by Bloomfield (1998) (former head of the Northern Ireland
Civil Service) as a state of ‘permanent impermanence’. Reflecting on the period
since 1972, one politician argued ‘the quality of government services in Northern
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Ireland too often lets down the people who are using them and who are paying
for them through their taxes. That is in part, although not entirely, a legacy
of nearly four decades of violence’ (Lidington, 2004). With a major political
development to restore a devolved administration in the form of the Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement, participating parties agreed that it was time to take
stock of the way in which public services were delivered in Northern Ireland
through a Review of Public Administration. In light of the Review this article
will attempt to do three key things. First, it will describe the complex edifice
that is the Northern Ireland public sector which has led to charges that it is both
over-governed and over-administered (Carmichael and Osborne, 2003; Knox,
1999). Second, it will contextualise and explicate the current reform process
and emerging changes proposed for the public sector. Third, using attitudinal
survey data, it will evaluate empirically these proposals against the Minister’s
assertion that ‘improving services lies at the heart of any new model of public
administration for Northern Ireland’.
The current system of public administration
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland dates back
only to December 1999 at which point power was devolved to the Northern
Ireland Assembly and its Executive Committee as a result of the 1998 Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement.1 Devolution in Northern Ireland is part of the wider
constitutional reform agenda of the Labour Government which has seen powers
devolved to the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, London Assembly and
the future possibility of English regional assemblies. Devolution itself is seen
by the government as integral to a wider modernising approach of renewal
and reform of public services, the aims of which are: to ensure that policy
making is more joined up and strategic; public service users, not providers,
are the focus of activities; and public services are high quality and efficient
(Cabinet Office, 1999). Devolved government in Northern Ireland witnessed
the six pre-existing government departments responsible for public services
under Direct Rule reconfigured and expanded to ten departments with an
additional department (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister,
OFMDFM) to manage the Programme for Government and the agenda of the
new Executive. The restructuring of departments had no administrative logic but
was the outcome of political negotiations between the main political parties (but
mostly the Ulster Unionists and the SDLP) who agreed that the Northern Ireland
Executive should comprise twelve ministers: six unionists and six nationalists.2 As
Wilson (2001: 74) reported, ‘the unspoken calculus was that Sinn Fe´in would not
be satisfied with only one executive seat; ten departments were required to ensure
the party enjoyed two. The result was an allocation of ministerial positions as
follows: Sinn Fe´in two, SDLP three, Ulster Unionist Party three and Democractic
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Figure 1. Public expenditure 2003–04.
Unionist Party two’. Additionally, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister has two junior ministers. These political machinations therefore
dictated the current structure of government with each department headed by a
minister (and OFMDFM two junior ministers). Politically-derived administrative
changes were not, however, a completely new experience for Northern Ireland.
As a former Head of the Civil Service recounts, ‘in 1973–74 when departmental
structures were last re-examined in the context of impending devolution, a major
influence was the imperative to find ministerial posts capable of accommodating
a specific political balance in a coalition context’ (Bloomfield, 1998: 146).
The eleven government departments are responsible for the bulk of
‘transferred’ public services3 and, under devolved government arrangements, are
accountable to ministers who liaise with their respective statutory committees
(for each of the ten departments). The committees are there ‘to advise and
assist each Northern Ireland Minister in the formulation of policy with respect
to matters within his/her responsibilities as a Minister’ (Northern Ireland Act,
1998: section 29). In 2003–4 the total expenditure on devolved public services
in Northern Ireland was £7.32 billion (see Figure 1), with a staffing complement
of 29,500 civil servants4 (OFMDFM, 2004). ‘Next Steps’ executive agencies have
been established in several of the departments to deliver services within a policy
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Figure 2. The Northern Ireland public sector.
and resources framework which sets out policy objectives, budgets, specific
targets and results to be achieved. Agencies were a direct ‘read-across’ from
policy developments following the Ibbs Report in Great Britain (Efficiency Unit,
1988) which recommended that the work of each government department was
organised in a way which focused on the job to be done: the systems and structures
must enhance the effective delivery of policies and services. There are eighteen
executive agencies5 ranging from the Water Service which has a budget of almost
£250 million and over 2,000 staff, to the Public Records Office with a £2.3 million
budget and around 70 staff. Overall, some 48 per cent of civil servants work
within executive agencies of devolved departments (OFMDFM, 2003a).
While this accounts for those services currently operated by civil service
departments, the overall administrative edifice for a population of 1.7 million
people is much more complex. The Northern Ireland public sector is a mosaic of
departments, agencies, non-departmental public bodies and local government
(see Figure 2). Non-departmental public bodies or quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations (quangos) perform key executive and advisory
roles in public services in Northern Ireland. Quangos are set up to carry out
functions that are best delivered at arm’s length from government. In the case of
Northern Ireland, however, a number of functions ordinarily within the remit
of local government in other parts of the United Kingdom were assigned to
quangos (following the Macrory Report, 1970). Major services such as housing,
education and personal social services (the latter as an integrated provision with
health) are delivered through quangos, many of which report to boards whose
members are appointed by ministers or departmental civil servants. Planning is
an Executive Agency in the Department of the Environment. The general trend
toward quasi-government organisations was criticised by Weir (1995: 320) who
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argued ‘in area after area of public life, elected government is being replaced by
appointive government. Those who are elected count for ever less; those who are
appointed count for ever more’. In a period of Direct Rule from Westminster
the burgeoning number of quangos merely served to compound the democratic
deficit in Northern Ireland. In March 2003 there were 2,061 public appointments
to 99 public bodies (Central Appointments Unit, 2003). These range across the
following bodies:
 Executive non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) which carry out
administrative, regulatory, executive or commercial functions (such as
education and library boards; health trusts; health and social services boards;
fire authority).
 Advisory NDPBs which provide independent, expert advice to Ministers
and officials (for example, Historic Building Council; Law Reform Advisory
Committee; NI Water Council).
 Tribunals which have semi-judicial functions (such as Office of Industrial
Tribunals; Planning Appeals Commission).
 Other bodies (such as Northern Ireland Transport Holding Company; Rural
Development Council; Registered Housing Associations).
 Boards of visitors to penal institutions.
The system of appointment to these bodies has been the subject of review, and
procedures now conform to seven principles: ministerial responsibility; merit;
independent scrutiny; equal opportunities; probity; openness and transparency;
and proportionality. A Commissioner for Public Appointments (NI) conducts
an annual audit to ensure compliance with these principles. This, however, does
little to dispel public perceptions that a gravy train of quangocrats, comprising
politically acceptable nominees, are responsible for a large amount of public
expenditure in Northern Ireland.
Local government in Northern Ireland is the poor relation in the public
sector and plays a relatively minor role in public service provision. This is a
direct consequence of their abuse of powers during the Stormont era (1921–72).
Typically, the role played by local authorities in the allocation of public housing
and the imbalance in the senior ranks of public sector (local government and the
civil service) gave rise inter alia to charges of deliberate bias against Catholics.
Darby’s (1976: 78) conclusion on the period that there was ‘a consistent and
irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against Catholics’ is supported
by Whyte, who argued that ‘the most serious charge against the Northern Ireland
government is not that it was directly responsible for widespread discrimination,
but that it allowed discrimination on such a scale over a substantial segment of
Northern Ireland’ (Whyte, 1983: 31). Local authorities were therefore stripped
of their powers. Since 1973 the 26 single tier authorities are elected every four
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years by single transferable vote proportional representation and spend around
£340 million annually or 4.4 per cent of the public budget (Department of the
Environment, 2003). Local councils have three main roles: an executive role in
which they provide certain regulatory services (for example, building regulations,
environmental health) and a limited range of functions such as street cleaning,
refuse collection, cemeteries and crematoria, recreation and tourist amenities
and economic development; a representative role where members are nominated
to serve on area boards (for example, education and library boards); and a
consultative role where councils’ views are sought on centrally provided services
such as planning, roads, water and housing. Despite their limited range of powers,
councils have been successful advocates in brokering the disjointed services of
other public sector bodies for the benefit of their areas. Importantly, for successive
periods of Direct Rule, local government remained the only democratic forum in
Northern Ireland and led the way in promoting power-sharing between the main
political parties before the principles of proportionality and cross-community
consent were embedded in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and the workings
of the Assembly.
In sum, the administrative arrangements for a small population are complex,
hugely bureaucratic and confusing to the public. One observer recently described
the infrastructure of the Northern Ireland state apparatus as ‘bloated, unwieldly
and not fit for purpose’. He argued ‘it is more collectivist than Stalinist Russia,
more corporatist than Mussolini’s Italy and more quangoised than the Britain
of two Harolds’ (Smith, 2004: 67): an eloquent, if over-the-top, description
containing nonetheless a modicum of truth.
The context for reform
A number of contextual factors had an important bearing on the impetus for the
Review of Public Administration. The most obvious change driver was devolution
in Northern Ireland which followed the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998
and the establishment of an elected Assembly and Executive. When the powers
of government were devolved on 2 December 1999 to local members of the
legislative assembly (MLAs), one of their priorities was to reform and modernise
public services, a policy consistent with the Westminster modernisation agenda.
The Northern Ireland reform agenda has three main foci: investing in the
infrastructure needed to deliver public services; improving public services; and a
Review of Public Administration to look at who provides services, the way they
are provided, and how effectively they meet the needs of the citizen (Northern
Ireland Executive, 2002). The (then) First Minister noted in an Assembly debate:
The Review of Public Administration is one of the major tasks facing the Executive and will be
central to the way in which we deliver, structure and organise our public services in the future.
This is an opportunity of a generation to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system
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of public administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services to our citizens.
(Trimble, 2002: 371)
There was agreement among politicians that the plethora and complexity of
public bodies inevitably resulted in Northern Ireland being over-administered,
if not over-governed, with three MEPs, 18 MPs, 108 MLAs and 582 councillors.
Importantly, however, the First Minister was reluctant to upset the administrative
architecture so carefully negotiated to achieve a power-sharing Executive. Hence,
non-departmental public bodies, local government and ‘Next Steps’ Agencies are
part of the Review but the eleven government departments have been ruled out.
The official rather abstruse position is ‘the Review is likely to have implications
for the functions exercised by the Executive, but the institutions established by
the Agreement and the division of functions between the eleven departments
will not be part of the Review’s remit’ (OFMDFM: 2002). With this important
omission, the terms of reference for the Review, launched in June 2002, are:
To review the existing arrangements for accountability, administration and delivery of public
services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options for reform which are consistent with
the arrangements and principles of the Belfast Agreement, within an appropriate framework of
political and financial accountability. (Review of Public Administration, 2002)
The Review is being led by a multi-disciplinary team of officials in the Office
of the Minister and Deputy First Minister, working with the advice of a
team of independent experts. While most politicians welcomed the Review,
there were notable exceptions. Robert McCartney (UK Unionist, MLA) argued
strongly against the exclusion of the eleven government departments, criticising
this as a means of shoring up the Northern Ireland Executive. ‘Under the
d’Hondt system, the four main parties that provide the 10 ministers have a
vested interest in continuing as before . . . there is no effective opposition, no
joined-up government and no Cabinet responsibility. There are 10 independent
warlordships’ (McCartney, 2002). There were also criticisms of the fact that
the Review was being led by civil servants in the Office of the First Minister
and Deputy First Minister reporting to a subcommittee of the Executive.
Characterising civil servants as ‘budget maximising bureaucrats’ (Dunleavy, 1991)
in a rhetorical question, McCartney continued ‘officials will have a vested interest
in keeping their own administrative empires going – who has ever heard of a civil
servant who has been anxious to reduce the number beneath him (sic) in the
pyramid?’ There is empirical support for this view expressed by Grindle (2001:
31) who found in other reform studies that the organisation of service delivery
was of little interest to users or citizens. Reform, he claimed, is generally an elite
process: ‘it is not public demands, the legislature or interest groups that define
reform initiatives but small groups located in the executive’.
The (Direct Rule) Minister now responsible for overseeing the Review has
noted that ‘improving services to the public lies at the heart of any new model of
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public administration’ (Pearson, 2004a). There is an acknowledgement that the
‘reform process is not an end in itself and is only of value if it results in measurably
better services for the public that deliver real value for money’ (OFMDFM, 2004:
89).
The Review Team has been charged with fulfilling the following ten
characteristics in making recommendations for change:
1. Democratic accountability: to ensure the democratic oversight by elected
representatives of services provided within their area of responsibility and
holding to account those delivering other services not directly within their
remit.
2. Community responsiveness: to make services responsive to local needs and
variations in those needs.
3. Cross-community concerns: to protect the concerns of communities which
are in a minority in different parts of Northern Ireland, in terms of delivery
and accountability of public services and ensuring proper protection of their
interests.
4. Equality and human rights, including equity of access: to provide and deliver
services fairly throughout Northern Ieland so that any new arrangements
from the Review comply with equality and human rights legislation.
5. Subsidiarity: to consider which services are best developed, overseen and
delivered at local level, sub-regional and regional levels and the co-ordination
of policy making and service delivery across these levels.
6. Quality of service: to ensure that services are delivered as efficiently and
effectively as possible to certain quality standards.
7. Co-ordination and integration of services: to examine the potential for co-
operation between different types of services to deliver cross-cutting policies.
8. Scope of the public sector: to assess the appropriateness of services being
provided by the public sector and the role of the private and community/
voluntary sector in contributing to better public services.
9. Efficiency and effectiveness: to consider the best use of resources so that any
reorganisation creates the most effective and efficient services to the public,
avoiding duplication, minimising managerial and bureaucratic expenditure
and maximising spending on front-line services.
10 Innovation and business organisation: to be forward-looking by examining
the needs of people in five to ten years time through opportunities arising
from new technology and better ways of delivering services. (Adapted from
Review of Public Administration, 2002).
The original timescale for the Review (launched in June 2002) was an interim
report, following consultation, to the Northern Ireland Executive by Spring 2003
and final recommendations on a preferred model by the end of 2003. All of this
assumed the continuance of devolved government, with the Northern Ireland
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Executive taking ownership of this key policy development. Devolution, however,
has been intermittent and faltering,6 plagued by a series of incidents giving rise
to a lack of trust between the political parties and loss of confidence in the
outworkings of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement among unionists. With the
Assembly now in suspension for fourth time since October 2002, the Secretary of
State, while acknowledging that the key decisions should be taken by the devolved
government, has continued to progress the work of the Review consulting with
the main political parties as necessary. The government intends to produce a ‘firm
proposals document’ for consultation in Autumn 2004 with a view to legislating
on changes in Spring 2005 and an implementation date in time for the local
government elections of 2009.
Progress report
What have been the keys outputs from the Review thus far? The Review Team
has been industrious. It has engaged in widespread consultation and research
broadly categorised as: public attitude surveys on their experiences of government
services; study visits to other jurisdictions (Europe, North America, Australia and
New Zealand) which examined how public services were structured and delivered;
qualitative (focus group) engagement with key stakeholders (general public,
providers, and users of public services; and public sector staff); organisational
mapping of the public sector; and briefing papers on key issues in public
administration. The findings from the above work informed a consultation paper
launched in October 2003 which set out five possible models for consideration
in rethinking the structural architecture of public services.
1. Status quo: This model envisages no change to the overall structure of public
administration.
2. Centralised: Under this model all major services would be delivered directly
by government departments.
3. Regional and sub-regional public bodies: A range of public bodies, operating
either regionally or sub-regionally, would deliver public services.
4. Reformed status quo with enhanced local government : While keeping the
main features of the current system, local government would be given new
responsibilities.
5. Strong local government : Major public services would be the responsibility
of a smaller number of new councils. (Review of Public Administration in
Northern Ireland, 2003: 25–29).
The consultation ended in February 2004 and attracted 170 written responses.
The general points emerging from the responses were:
 There is unanimous support for the need for change and a demand for early
action.
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 ‘Quality of service’ is seen as more important than the means by which the
service is delivered.
 There is a widespread consensus on the need for fewer public bodies, with
more collaboration and less fragmentation.
 There is a preference for models 4 and 5 above with fewer quangos and a smaller
number of larger councils having more powers.
 Coterminosity of administrative boundaries is seen as essential to facilitate
effective collaboration.
 There is a recognition that some services are best delivered centrally but there
is scope for more local delivery than at present.
 The Assembly, Executive and Departments should be responsible for policy
and strategic development, as well as monitoring standards, but not for the
delivery of services.
 While some aspects of health are best delivered regionally, most services
should be delivered by sub-regional organisations each serving populations
of approximately 250,000.
 There is a need for fair and robust governance arrangements to ensure
transparent decision-making and protection of minority interests. (Northern
Ireland Executive, 2004)
In light of the consultation findings, the (Direct Rule) Minister made his
preference known for the shape of the final model, due to go out for consultation
in Autumn 2004, by suggesting a two-tier system of regional and sub-regional
bodies. At the regional level the Assembly and government departments will
be responsible for policy development, strategic planning, setting standards and
monitoring performance. Regional authorities and ‘Next Steps’ Agencies will
deliver those services of province-wide import. At the sub-regional level, the
emphasis will be on service delivery through larger local authorities and sub-
regional bodies with council-led community planning and civic leadership (see
Figure 3).
The Minister commented ‘it is clearly evident that people want the Review to
move ahead without delay, that improving the quality of public services should
be the prime consideration for reform, and that there are too many public bodies
at present and a lack of effective co-ordination and collaboration between service
providers’ (Pearson, 2004b). He summarised the likely detail of his final model
thus:
 a significant reduction in the number of public bodies, including health service
bodies;
 the reduction in the number of councils from 26 to between five and eight
more powerful councils which could have responsibilities for an increased
range of functions such as regeneration, environmental services, some planning
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Figure 3. Developing model of public administration.
functions and local roads, delivered within administrative boundaries which
are aligned with other service providers;
 arrangements at local level to safeguard the maintenance of local identity and
community input to decision-making; and
 robust governance arrangements to ensure transparent decision-making,
fairness and the protection of minority rights.
Evaluating the proposed reforms
Toonen (2003) argues that administrative reform as a process is best conceived
of as somewhere on a continuum between planned change on the one hand and
emerging incremental strategy on the other. While reform is often presented as the
outcome of a planned approach, in practice however the process of consultation
and negotiation among the institutional and administrative interests turns grand
stated ambitions into modest changes. He suggests:
Reform is best conceived of as a long-term, less rationally designed, piecemeal and cyclical
process. A process that is full of inconsistencies, and self-induced consequences, but also with
expected serendipities, which, in the long run, may actually generate some decent results, next
to the misses inherent to any experimental and learning processes. (Toonen, 2003: 473)
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Importantly, he goes on to argue that while economic pressures in the 1970s
and 1980s forced governments in the Western world into a series of institutional
and budgetary reforms, we should not disregard the importance of politics,
ideology and leadership. ‘Politics matters in administrative reform, particularly
in terms of politically framing the problem, timing the initiatives and setting the
reform agenda’ (Toonen, 2003: 474). Yet none of the characteristics for reforms
makes reference to political influences on the outcomes of the Review. Despite
the absence of devolution, local political parties must be satisfied with (or at
least acquiesce in) the outcomes of the Review, hence the Minister’s desire for
regular briefings. Thus far, given the Minister’s preference for fewer councils,
some political parties are promoting the idea of 18 local authorities based on
Westminster boundaries. This, of course, makes the political calculus simple and
the number of unionist/nationalist controlled councils relatively easy to predict.
The Minister is also anticipating the restoration of devolution, at which point
local MLAs must assume ownership of his proposals and implement the necessary
changes.
According to Frost (2002), reforming the organisational structure of the
public service is a key strategy in improving efficiency within government.
Restructuring seeks to address three concerns: that policy makers have become
distanced from the public; the public service has become inflexible; and the
public service has become inefficient. He argues that a key challenge is that
boundaries are no longer clear with the increasing varieties of operating or
executive agencies. As a consequence, the traditional lines between the public
service and the broader public sector are now harder to trace. A second and
related challenge, he suggests, concerns the attraction of the one-off ‘big-fix’
solution to public service shortcomings:
Changing organisational structures can, at some considerable human and financial cost, address
structural problems. If the problems are more directly related to managerial practices and
support systems, or to weak or uncertain ethical frameworks, structural solutions are an
expensive method for answering the wrong question. (Frost, 2002: 90)
This highlights one systemic flaw in the Northern Ireland Review of Public
Administration: its emphasis on structural reorganisation. The review is being
hailed as a means of improving the quality of public services, but it is doing
so in the absence of a modernising agenda. Key policy initiatives in the rest
of the United Kingdom – such as Modernising Government (Cm 4310, 1999),
Reforming our Public Services – Principles into Practice (Office of Public Services
Reform, 2002) and the most recent policy debate contained in The Future of Local
Government: Developing a 10 year Vision (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister,
2004) – have all but bypassed Northern Ireland. This is exemplified by the public
service agreement for the Public Service Reform Unit in Northern Ireland whose
key target is ‘to ensure through the Freedom of Information Act, rights of access to
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information by January 2005’ (OFMDFM, 2004: 137). Hardly core to improving
public services!
Parallel concerns about institutional restructuring have been expressed in
New Zealand, regarded as an international model of public services reform.
Evidence of efficiency gains have been crowded out by unease over restructuring.
Shaw (2000: 275) argued that organisational change ‘saps morale and loyalty,
drains institutional wisdom and experience, and deflects the attention of
public servants away from their primary responsibilities to citizens’. In short,
reorganisation becomes an end in itself for public servants preoccupied with
their vested career interests.
The literature on public service reform is dominated by the extent to
which countries have embraced the elements of new public management:
budgetary reforms, marketisation and privatisation, efficiency and effectiveness,
decentralisation and a customer orientation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000;
McLaughlin et al., 2002; Lynn, 2003). In Northern Ireland the reform agenda
appears entirely institutional in nature. Such managerial reform as has taken
place is through a process of ‘read-across’ from the Great Britain rather than
a dedicated public service reform agenda. According to Batley (2004), reform
entails more than restructuring institutions. It is not, he claims ‘just a technical
matter of finding the best design solution and applying it . . . nor is reform
only a narrowly political process of confronting specific interests . . . it is a more
complex reality where political and administrative arrangements embody values,
behaviour and structures of power’ (Batley, 2004: 36).
By way of a formative evaluation of the proposed changes, a number of
specific observations can be made. First, concern has been expressed that the
Review has become a review of local government rather than public administration
in its widest sense. This perception has been fuelled by the Minister’s early (some
have suggested premature) declaration that the number of councils will reduce
from 26 to between five and eight local authorities with greater powers. His
early pronouncements also contravene the principle that ‘form’ should follow
‘functions’: agree what functions each tier of government should deliver and
develop a structural model which best fits the functional split. The Minister
has made imprecise references to functions which larger councils ‘could have
responsibility for’ but, in advance of the final consultation round, has already
predetermined (within narrow limits) the structural configuration of local
government in the future.
Second, the focus on local government as the most visible manifestation
of public service deliverers draws attention away from other significant public
administration players. The ‘Next Steps’ Agencies for example, employing 48 per
cent of the civil service, receive no mention in any future reform plans. It is
conspicuous that none of the 18 agencies even responded to the first consultation
document although they are clearly within the remit of the Review, adding
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credence to the view that this is a review of local government. This is either a
puzzling oversight on their behalf or part of an accepted wisdom that any Review
will not meddle with the machinery of central government. If, for example, the
functions of the four key agencies within the Department of the Environment7
were to be relocated, its raison d’eˆtre would be in serious doubt. The same could
be said of the Department for Regional Development where the removal of the
functions of its two major agencies8 would leave the department as a hollow
shell.
Third, the need for administrative reform in Northern Ireland has a focal
point around the issue of quangos or non-departmental public bodies. Pre-
devolution, quangos had been an attractive option for Direct Rule Ministers.
The presence of a powerless local government forum, the need for government
to distance itself from functions such as housing which had been tarnished
by sectarian malpractice, and the usefulness of strengthening participative
democracy through nominees on quangos in a Province with a democractic
deficit (Direct Rule from Westminster) created circumstances where quangos
flourished. Post-devolution, representative democracy was in the ascendancy and
MLAs flexed their combined political muscle to dismantle quasi-government,
seeing the Review of Public Administration as the means of so doing. Such
expectations need to be dampened from the experience elsewhere. In Wales, for
example, the Welsh Development Agency, Education and Training Body (ELWa),
and the Wales Tourist Board will be abolished from April 2006 and their staff
and functions absorbed into the Assembly Government civil service. These three
bodies represent ‘some two-thirds of quangoland’ according to First Minister
Rhodri Morgan (Osmond, 2004: 2). In Scotland, where a similar exercise took
place, radical intentions to reform quangos did not result in the expected cull. As
one observer of the Scottish case noted, ‘for those hoping for an end to quangos
following devolution there is disappointment. Though bonfires were promised,
as institutions NDPBs have proven to be remarkably flame-resistant’ (Orr, 2003:
167). What resulted was described by the Scottish Executive as a ‘timely tidying-
up, modernising exercise’ (Scottish Executive, 2001: 2, cited by Orr, 2003). These
may be prophetic words for Northern Ireland’s reformers.
Fourth, there are concerns that the move to reduce the number of local
authorities to between five and eight will significantly impact on the sense of
locality upon which the current 26 principal towns/cities and associated councils
are predicated. The sense of place is strong in Northern Ireland, and local
councillors, despite their lack of responsibility for major public services, have
been the first port of call for constituents in need of help and advice. Even with
the devolved Assembly and Executive (since 1999), recent evidence shows that
councillors are contacted much more regularly than MLAs or MPs (O’Brien,
2003). Although the Minister has flagged the issue of local identity as an issue
for the final consultation paper in the Review, there appears to be little appetite
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among existing local authorities for a lower symbolic tier of community councils
whose primary role would be advocacy. Equally, the Review Team is against
proposing a two-tier system of local government when their primary purpose is
to cut an over-administered system of public administration.
Fifth, any proposals for a strong local government also call into question
its role vis a` vis the Assembly. The proposed central/local split (see Figure 3
above) envisages the Assembly responsible for policy development and strategic
planning, and councils as sub-regional services deliverers. Importantly, councils
are likely to play a key role in other functions which might not fall within
their remit – such as health, education and housing – through new powers
of ‘well-being’ and the democratisation of bodies charged with the delivery of
these functions. This places local government in a powerful functional role, one
whose significance may be more obvious to electors than the Northern Ireland
Assembly. Currently almost two-thirds of members of the Assembly are also local
councillors (69 councillors within the 108MLAs) raising questions about whether
there is a need for this number of MLAs to represent 1.7 million population. By
way of comparison, there are 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament (popu-
lation 5.05 million) and 60 Welsh Assembly Members (population 2.92
million).9 Scotland and Wales also have more traditional local government
systems.
On what basis will the outcomes of the Review be judged? Clearly, the
final model must meet its terms of reference which emphasise that the reforms
should be ‘consistent with the arrangements and principles of the Belfast (Good
Friday) Agreement and within an appropriate framework of political and financial
accountability’. These terms are broadly cast and sufficiently nebulous (what
does ‘appropriate framework’ mean?) to claim most outcomes fulfil the brief.
What will be more difficult to realise, however, are the ten characteristics of the
Review. There is no ranking associated with these characteristics and hence the
assumption must be that they are all equally important. Moreover, there is no
acceptance that some may be incongruous. For example, Review proposals which
promote cross-community concerns must acknowledge that Northern Ireland is
an increasingly polarised society. Typically, in the public housing sector over
70 per cent of housing estates are more than 90 per cent Protestant or Catholic
(OFMDFM, 2003b). The consequences of this acute segregation are the financial
costs of duplicating public services for each of the communities due to low inter-
community mobility and the additional costs of addressing sectarianism. As one
research report noted:
The divided community within Northern Ireland creates an environment where provision of
public services is more expensive, and additional community relations services are required.
These additional costs span a large number of departments and range from programmes
introduced to break down social barriers between communities to additional expenditure
required to attract visitors to the region. (Harbison, 2002: Appendix 6:58)
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Figure 4. Satisfaction with public services.
Hence, meeting the Review’s characteristic of protecting minority
communities seems incompatible with their goals of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’
where they explicitly refer to ‘avoiding duplication of services’. Other potential
anomalies include the impact of attempts to operationalise the principle of
subsidiarity on the efficiency of public service provision, particularly economies
of scale. Despite their goal of co-ordinated and integrated services, there may well
be problems in joined-up provision between the regional services (through the
Assembly), sub-regional services (through councils), other sub-regional services
(through health, housing bodies) and a rump of non-departmental public bodies
which may remain untouched by the reforms (such as the Northern Ireland
Housing Executive).
Improved public services?
Ultimately the Review of Public Administration must demonstrate that ‘it results
in measurably better services for the public that deliver real value for money’
(OFMDFM, 2004: 89). This is a useful touchstone for the Review but a tall order,
not least because of definitional issues as to what constitutes ‘better services’
which deliver ‘real value for money’. We can examine current public attitudes
to service provision from baseline information, drawing on two sets of survey
data: the Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey (2002: n = 1,203) and the Northern
Ireland Life and Times Survey (2003: n = 1,800).10 The data show that 45 per cent
of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with public services in Northern
Ireland; 20 per cent stated they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied; and 34
per cent reported they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (see Figure 4). Survey
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TABLE 1. Public services – devolution and direct rule.
Education % Health % Economy %
Devolved Direct Devolved Direct Devolved Direct
government rule government rule government rule
Better 26.4 7.0 16.3 6.3 24.4 5.8
Worse 16.3 13.2 34.9 24.8 18.7 19.3
Same 57.4 79.8 48.7 68.9 57.0 74.9
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Figure 5. Devolution and direct rule.
respondents were further asked whether education, health and the economy
had ‘got better’, ‘worse’, or ‘stayed the same’ under the last Northern Ireland
Assembly (23 September 2001 to 14 October 2002), and since the suspension of
the Assembly (direct rule). The results are set out in Table 1.11 Considering one of
these services (the economy) in more detail demonstrates a significant difference
in performance under devolved government and direct rule arrangements (see
Figure 5). The results can be compared with service improvements in other
devolved regions of the United Kingdom which have been relatively low. For
example, in Scotland and Wales, 23 per cent and 24 per cent of survey respondents
felt standards had improved in the National Health Service; 27 per cent and 30
per cent in education; 30 per cent and 31 per cent in the general standard of living,
respectively (Jeffery, 2004).
Using Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, we compared the two
types of administration (direct rule and devolution).12 The results are shown in
Tables 2 and 3 and illustrate a significant improvement in the economy and
education under devolved government, but no significant difference in health
services (see Table 3 for significance levels).
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TABLE 2. Direct rule and devolution, comparing education, health and the
economy.
N Mean rank Sum of ranks
Education under direct Negative ranks 386a 294.34 113616.00
rule Positive ranks 194b 282.86 54874.00
Education under Ties 893c
devolution Total 1473
Health under direct rule Negative ranks 283d 304.41 86148.00
Health under devolution Positive ranks 305e 285.30 87018.00
Ties 986f
Total 1574
The economy under Negative ranks 370g 279.24 103317.00
direct rule Positive ranks 162h 237.41 38461.00
The economy under Ties 998i
devolution Total 1530
Notes: a. Education under direct rule < education under devolution.
b. Education under direct rule > education under devolution.
c. Education under devolution = education under direct rule.
d. Health under direct rule < health under devolution.
e. Health under direct rule > health under devolution.
f. Health under devolution = health under direct rule.
g. The economy under direct rule < the economy under devolution.
h. The economy under direct rule > the economy under devolution.
i. The economy under devolution = the economy under direct rule.
TABLE 3. Differences across education, health and the economy test
statisticsc.
Education under The economy under
direct rule – Health under direct direct rule – the
education under rule – health under economy under
devolution devolution devolution
Z −7.860a −.114b −9.764a
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .910 .000
Notes: a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Based on negative ranks.
c. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests.
What is surprising about the results is that the public’s experiences of these
services might suggest a rather different picture. Far from devolved government
being a model of service excellence, it was dogged by controversy. In health,
for example, a protracted and unresolved debate over the rationalisation of
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acute hospitals in Northern Ireland was passed to Direct Rule Minister, Des
Browne, who took the decision that quality of health care must take precedence
over access and reduced the number of acute hospitals from fifteen to nine
(with the addition of a new acute hospital in Enniskillen). Minister Bairbre
de Bru´n had procrastinated over the decision, not least because the site for a
new facility involved two Sinn Fe´in MPs battling it out for its location in each
of their constituencies. Similarly, a decision on the site for a new centralised
maternity unit in Belfast had to be taken by Direct Rule Minister, Angela Smith,
as political controversy raged over its location. Bairbre de Bru´n’s preferred
venue at the Royal Victoria Hospital (in her West Belfast constituency) was
selected, much to the chagrin of unionists. The devolved Sinn Fe´in minister also
faced huge pressure over increased waiting lists. During her tenure, Northern
Ireland acquired the unenviable reputation of having the longest waiting list
(60,000) per capita in Europe, now reduced during Direct Rule (at March
2004) to 50,000 (Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety,
2004).
In education, Sinn Fe´in Minister Martin McGuinness, following a review
of the education selection system regulated by transfer tests in the last year of
primary schooling (the so-called ‘11-plus’), unilaterally announced its abolition
as one of the final acts of the devolved administration in October 2002. Direct
Rule Minister Jane Kennedy was left to pick up the pieces of the proposed
new system based on ‘informed parental choice’ through ‘pupil profiles’, and
although the timescale for abolition has slipped considerably, the intention is still
to end the current system of academic selection. Mr McGuinness also stopped
the publication of school league tables under his tenure. In higher education
the SDLP Minister, Sean Farren, pushed through the introduction of student
fees against the advice of his statutory committee which advocated the Scottish
model of abolishing up-front fees, introducing bursaries and establishing an
income-contingent graduate endowment (Osborne, 2002).
The fact that the public records a significant improvement (or no significant
difference) in key public services under devolved government in the face of
these (selective) issues might suggest an association between service provision
and constitutional arrangements. Since support for devolution (and its sine
qua non, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement) is now ebbing away within the
unionist population, accelerated by the IRA’s intransigence on decommissioning,
their attitudes to public services may well be conditioned by their increasing
dissatisfaction with the outworkings of the Agreement. In short, it might be
argued that how people perceive public services is contingent on their views
on the constitutional arrangements (Direct Rule/devolved government) which,
in turn, are linked to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement rather than the
performance of delivery agents (central government departments/agencies, local
government and non-departmental public bodies).
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We examine this association between the following variables13 using logit
analysis. Logit analysis is a regression style causal analysis and we test whether
people’s opinions on education, health and the economy are affected by their
religion, attitude to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and support for the Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement.
Dependent variable:
 Education (deveduc): respondent’s opinion on whether education has ‘got
better’, ‘worse’ or ‘stayed the same’ under the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Factors:
 Northern Ireland Assembly (niabol): respondent’s opinion on whether he/she
would be ‘pleased’, ‘sorry’ or ‘wouldn’t mind either way’ if the Northern Ireland
Assembly were to be abolished and Northern Ireland returned to Direct Rule.
 Support for the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (votegfa): how respondent’s
would vote on the Good Friday Agreement if it were held today: ‘yes’, ‘no’ or
‘wouldn’t vote’.
 Religion of respondent (religcat): respondent’s religion categorised as
‘Catholic’, ‘Protestant’ or ‘no religion’.
We repeat this analysis using health and the economy as the dependent
variables.14
Results:
Model 1 (Education) has a chi-square likelihood ratio χ2(16) = 15.4, p= .50
Model 2 (Health) has a chi-square likelihood ratio χ2(16) = 14.5, p= .56
Model 3 (the Economy) has a chi-square likelihood ratio χ2(16) = 10.6, p= .83
All three models produce a ‘good fit’ to the data. Model 3, for example,
suggests there is at least an 83 per cent chance that any difference between the
cell frequencies predicted by the model and the actual observed cell frequencies
could be due to chance only, well within the conventional 0.05 cut-off level for a
significance test.
We can conclude from the analyses that people’s attitudes to public services
are affected by their community background (religion); support for the Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement; and their endorsement of devolution. Examining
the observed and expected frequencies (and adjusted residuals) in each model
suggests that Catholics are significantly more likely than Protestants to vote for
the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement today; would be sorry to see the abolition
of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a return to Direct Rule; and believe public
services have got better under devolution. It is perhaps worth noting that because
the health and education portfolios were held by two Sinn Fe´in ministers, this
may have influenced Protestant respondents’ views on whether these services
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improved under their stewardship. On the other hand, the Minister for Enterprise,
Trade and Investment was Sir Reg Empey (UUP) – the model of best fit (p= .83).
Conclusion
The Review of Public Administration, due to report on its final model in autumn
2004, has been described as a ‘means to an end’. The ‘end’ is improved quality of
public services in Northern Ireland. Yet political influences on both the process
(the Review) and the product (public services) predominate. In terms of process,
the parameters of the Review which excluded government departments were
politically conceived from the beginning. Local politicians weaned on a diet of
‘power without responsibility’ during 30 years of Direct Rule from Westminster
stand back while a British minister proposes radical reforms to local government,
their interest piqued only by the political calculus of any new configuration in
electoral boundaries.
In terms of product , the Review promises an improvement in public services,
but crucially the link between service quality and electoral accountability is
missing in Northern Ireland, eclipsed by constitutional politics. People in
Northern Ireland vote along unionist/nationalist cleavages, regardless of service
provision. Hence, while the ten rational characteristics established as the
benchmark for the final reform model are laudable, they will count for little
in the face of an agenda dictated by ‘high’ politics and judged accordingly by
the public. The public’s perceptions of service quality are a commentary on
devolution, the peace process, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, and perhaps
even the political affiliation of the Minister. Ultimately it is not the Review of
Public Administration which will deliver improved public services but a system
of devolved government in which the public holds to account the Northern
Ireland Assembly on their performance and delivery of core functions, driven by
a modernising agenda the absence of which is conspicuous.
Notes
1 Devolved government in Northern Ireland is currently suspended (at the time of writing,
October 2004) since October 2002. There have been four periods of devolution since the
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement: 2 December 1999 to 11 February 2000; 30 May 2000 to
10 August 2001; 12 August 2001 to 21 September 2001; and 23 September 2001 to 14 October
2002.
2 The Northern Ireland Act 1998: Section 17 states that the First and Deputy First Minister
acting jointly may determine the number of ministerial offices to be held by Northern
Ireland ministers, and the functions of each. There must be one such minister for
each Northern Ireland department. The Assembly, with cross-community support, must
approve the determination.
3 The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland remains responsible for ‘excepted’ and ‘reserved’
matters. Excepted matters are those matters of concern to the United Kingdom as a whole
where no local variation is possible, such as defence, foreign policy and taxation. Reserved
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matters are powers that have not been transferred to the devolved Assembly but which
could be at a later stage, such as policing and criminal justice.
4 Staffing figures are taken from Equal Opportunities in Northern Civil Service Report
(Department of Finance and Personnel, May 2003). The figures do not include direct
recruits to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Police Service of Northern Ireland and the
Northern Ireland Prison Service.
5 There are an additional three agencies within the Northern Ireland Office: Compensation
Agency; Forensic Science Agency; and the Prison Service.
6 There have been four periods of devolution in Northern Ireland since the Belfast (Good
Friday) Agreement: 2 December 1999 to 11 February 2000; 30 May 2000 to 10 August 2001;
12 August 2001 to 21 September 2001; and 23 September 2001 to 14 October 2002.
7 The four agencies in the Department of the Environment are: Planning Service; Driver
and Vehicle Licensing Agency; Environment and Heritage Service; and Driver and Vehicle
Testing Agency.
8 The two key agencies in the Department for Regional Development are the Water Service
and the Roads Service.
9 In Northern Ireland there is one MLA per 15,740 population; in Scotland one MSP per
39,150 people; and in Wales one Assembly Member per 48,700 population.
10 The Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey (2002) questions were commissioned by the Review
of Public Administration. Data were gathered using probability sampling from 1,203
respondents face to face across Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Life and Times
Survey (2003) involved 1,800 face-to-face interviews from randomly selected respondents
throughout Northern Ireland.
11 Figures exclude ‘don’t know’ and ‘other answer’.
12 This test takes account of the size of the differences between two sets of related scores
(people’s opinions on education, health and the economy under devolution and direct
rule) by ranking and then summing those with the same sign. If there are no differences
between the two samples, then the number of positive signs should be similar to that of
the negative ones (see for example Table 2: negative and positive ranks for health).
13 All the variables in the analysis were recoded to exclude categories such as ‘don’t know’,
‘other’, ‘not registered to vote’ and ‘refused’.
14 The model designs are as follows:
Model 1: (Education): Constant + deveduc + deveduc∗votegfa∗niabol + deveduc∗
niabol∗religcat + deveduc∗votegfa∗religcat
Model 2: (Health): Constant + devheal + devheal∗votegfa∗niabol + devheal∗niabol∗
religcat + devheal∗votegfa∗religcat
Model 3: (Economy): Constant + devecon + devecon∗votegfa∗niabol + devecon∗niabol∗
religcat + devecon∗votegfa∗religcat
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